Yet one troubling question continues to follow the Fighting Irish: Is their offense becoming too predictable?
A revealing statistical observation from Notre Dame’s matchup against BYU has brought that question into sharper focus.
According to the analysis highlighted in the original discussion, Notre Dame used play-action on just three of 51 quarterback dropbacks against BYU.
If that classification is accurate, it represents an unusually limited commitment to one of football’s most effective tools for manipulating defensive reactions.
The number alone does not prove that Notre Dame’s offensive system is broken.
However, it raises important questions about Mike Denbrock’s approach, CJ Carr’s responsibilities, and whether opposing defenses are being forced to respect enough possibilities.
For a program with championship ambitions, offensive predictability can become a serious vulnerability.
The concern is not simply whether Notre Dame can move the football against a particular opponent.
The bigger question is whether its offensive identity can withstand increasingly sophisticated defenses when the stakes become considerably higher.
And that conversation begins with the relationship between Carr and Denbrock.
A Talented Quarterback Facing a Complicated Challenge
CJ Carr represents an important piece of Notre Dame’s offensive future.
His development matters not only because of his individual ability, but because quarterback performance shapes nearly every aspect of an offense’s identity.
A successful quarterback must recognize defensive structures, anticipate pressure, manage protections, and deliver accurate throws under constantly changing circumstances.
Those responsibilities become more demanding when defenders believe they can anticipate the offense’s intentions.
Even talented quarterbacks struggle when defenses consistently identify passing situations before the ball is snapped.
That is why offensive creativity matters.
A quarterback benefits when linebackers hesitate, safeties question their assignments, and defensive coordinators must account for multiple threats.
Play-action can help create precisely that uncertainty.
By presenting the appearance of a running play, an offense can influence defenders who are responsible for stopping the ground attack.
Those reactions may open passing lanes, improve throwing windows, or create opportunities for receivers to attack vulnerable areas.
However, play-action is not a guaranteed solution.
Its effectiveness depends on timing, blocking, defensive structure, and whether the quarterback can execute the required mechanics.
The concern surrounding Notre Dame is therefore more nuanced than simply demanding additional play-action passes.
It concerns whether Carr is receiving enough tactical assistance to maximize his abilities.
If the offensive structure repeatedly places him in obvious passing situations, even excellent execution becomes more difficult.
And if opponents begin recognizing recurring formations and tendencies, the quarterback’s margin for error can shrink considerably.
The BYU Number That Sparked the Debate
Three play-action calls across 51 dropbacks would represent approximately 5.9 percent of the passing opportunities identified in the cited analysis.
That figure is striking because play-action has become an established component of modern college and professional offensive strategy.
Nevertheless, the precise interpretation requires caution.
Different analysts may classify play-action differently, particularly when evaluating run-pass options, abbreviated backfield fakes, and other hybrid concepts.
A dropback total may also include sacks or scrambles, depending on the statistical methodology.
Without reviewing the complete play-by-play classification, the reported figure should be treated as an analytical observation rather than independently confirmed official data.
Still, the underlying football question deserves attention.
Why would an offense with a capable quarterback and multiple potential receiving options use so little conventional play-action?
One explanation could involve the opponent’s defensive approach.
If BYU presented pressure looks or coverage structures that discouraged longer-developing concepts, Notre Dame may have favored quicker passing designs.
Another possibility involves protection.
Play-action sometimes requires offensive linemen to sell running action before transitioning into pass protection.
That process can create problems against aggressive defensive fronts if the timing or blocking assignments are imperfect.
Denbrock may also have preferred conventional dropbacks because he believed Carr could identify defensive coverage effectively without additional deception.
Those explanations are plausible tactical possibilities, not confirmed accounts of Notre Dame’s actual game-planning decisions.
The critical issue is whether the chosen approach created favorable opportunities consistently enough to justify its limitations.
A low play-action percentage is not automatically evidence of poor coaching.
But when combined with concerns about predictability, it becomes a legitimate starting point for deeper examination.
Mike Denbrock Is Under the Microscope
Mike Denbrock’s responsibility extends far beyond choosing individual plays.
An offensive coordinator must construct a system that challenges defenders while allowing his own players to perform confidently.
That requires balancing complexity with clarity.
An overly complicated offense can overwhelm players and create hesitation.
An overly simplified approach can make defensive preparation easier.
Finding the correct balance becomes especially important when developing a quarterback.
Carr needs enough structure to understand his responsibilities, but enough variety to prevent opponents from anticipating his decisions.
That challenge belongs partly to Denbrock.
Offensive coordinators frequently face criticism when drives stall, particularly when fans see similar concepts appearing repeatedly.
However, play-calling cannot be evaluated fairly without considering down, distance, field position, personnel availability, and defensive alignment.
A successful coordinator sometimes calls the same concept repeatedly because the opponent cannot stop it.
Predictability only becomes a serious problem when defensive recognition produces a measurable advantage.
For Notre Dame, the question is whether its tendencies are becoming sufficiently obvious to affect defensive behavior.
Are linebackers reacting confidently to familiar formations?
Are safeties rotating toward expected passing concepts?
Are pass rushers attacking aggressively because they rarely need to respect backfield deception?
Those questions require detailed film analysis before firm conclusions can be reached.
But they also identify the areas where Denbrock’s offensive strategy deserves scrutiny.
The coordinator’s challenge is not necessarily to reinvent Notre Dame’s offense.
It is to ensure that familiar formations can produce enough different outcomes to keep defenders uncertain.
That distinction separates offensive creativity from unnecessary complexity.
The BYU Defeat Made the Questions Impossible to Ignore
Notre Dame’s October 17 meeting with BYU provided a painful reminder that offensive potential does not guarantee results against elite competition.
The second-ranked Fighting Irish entered Provo undefeated, but the eighth-ranked Cougars emerged with a dramatic 28-24 victory.
Notre Dame fell to 6-1 after a contest featuring turnovers, missed opportunities, and a desperate final possession that ended near BYU’s goal line.
The Irish had recovered from a 21-10 halftime deficit to seize a 24-21 fourth-quarter lead.
But BYU answered with the winning touchdown with 1:47 remaining, leaving Notre Dame one final opportunity to respond.
The Irish advanced deep into BYU territory, but their comeback ended when the clock expired following an incomplete end-zone pass.
That sequence transformed a potential statement victory into one of the season’s most frustrating defeats.
Carr completed 27 of 49 passes for 261 yards, but his performance revealed the difficulties of facing a disciplined, competitive defense.
His completion percentage fell to approximately 55.1 percent, while his passing average stood at roughly 5.3 yards per attempt.
Those numbers do not mean Carr lacked talent or competitiveness.
They illustrate how difficult sustained offensive production can become when passing opportunities require consistently precise execution.
Jaden Greathouse provided one of Notre Dame’s strongest individual performances, catching eight passes for 125 yards.
Jordan Faison added six receptions for 64 yards, giving Carr multiple productive targets despite the offense’s inconsistency.
Nolan James Jr. also contributed 77 rushing yards and a touchdown on 16 carries.
These performances matter because they complicate the argument that Notre Dame simply lacked capable offensive players.
The Irish demonstrated that they could generate rushing gains, create receiving production, and move the football against a highly ranked opponent.
What they struggled to do was convert enough opportunities into decisive points.
That distinction is central to the debate.
A team can accumulate yardage without consistently controlling a game.
It can produce explosive individual moments without establishing an offensive rhythm that survives pressure, mistakes, and changing defensive adjustments.
Against BYU, Notre Dame showed flashes of the offense its supporters expected.
It also showed why flashes alone cannot satisfy a program pursuing national championship contention.
The Play-Action Debate Has a Complicated History
The criticism of Denbrock’s play-action usage did not emerge entirely from one disappointing afternoon.
An October analysis by A to Z Sports cited Pro Football Focus data indicating Notre Dame used play-action on 18.3 percent of dropbacks in 2025.
The same report identified only three play-action attempts across 51 dropbacks against BYU in 2026.
Those figures suggest a broader philosophical tendency, although different tracking methods can produce different conclusions.
Importantly, Denbrock has previously challenged how outside analysts classify his offensive concepts.
Earlier in October, he disputed PFF’s assessment that Notre Dame used play-action on approximately 15.5 percent of Carr’s dropbacks.
Denbrock argued that various backfield actions and passing designs were not necessarily captured by conventional statistical classifications.
He estimated that some variation of play-action appeared on approximately 25 to 30 percent of Notre Dame’s passing plays.
That disagreement is significant because the definition of play-action can change the statistical picture substantially.
A traditional handoff fake is relatively easy to identify.
A brief backfield flash, run-pass option, or movement designed to influence one specific defender can be more difficult to classify.
Therefore, the reported BYU figure should not automatically be interpreted as proof that Notre Dame used deception on only three passing plays.
However, Denbrock’s disagreement with the methodology does not eliminate the underlying concern.
The important issue is whether defenders were meaningfully influenced by Notre Dame’s offensive presentation.
If defenders remain comfortable attacking their assignments, technically incorporating backfield action may provide limited practical benefit.
Successful deception must alter defensive behavior.
That is the standard by which the Irish offense ultimately deserves to be judged.
Why Notre Dame’s Running Game Should Create More Opportunities
Notre Dame’s rushing attack offers a natural foundation for a more varied passing offense.
James, Aneyas Williams, and Jonaz Walton provide different options for establishing physicality and threatening defensive fronts.
Their individual roles may evolve, but their collective presence gives Denbrock several ways to challenge opposing defenses.
Walton’s emergence has been particularly interesting.
Before the BYU matchup, Denbrock praised the freshman’s development after an extended opportunity against North Carolina.
Walton had surpassed 100 rushing yards in that appearance, demonstrating the potential to contribute meaningfully to Notre Dame’s backfield rotation.
A productive rushing attack can force linebackers to respect downhill runs and safeties to consider supporting the box.
That creates opportunities for complementary passing concepts.
For example, Notre Dame could present a familiar running formation before attacking the space behind an aggressive linebacker.
A tight end crossing the formation might initially resemble a blocker before releasing into an open passing lane.
A receiver could threaten a vertical route after defensive backs respond to run-oriented movement.
These are hypothetical tactical possibilities, not claims about specific plays Denbrock has installed.
Their value lies in making different offensive outcomes emerge from similar initial presentations.
The objective is to make defenders hesitate.
Even a brief delay can improve a quarterback’s throwing window or help an offensive lineman maintain protection.
But the rushing game must remain credible.
If Notre Dame cannot consistently threaten opponents on the ground, play-action becomes less persuasive against disciplined defensive units.
That is why improvements in rushing efficiency and passing creativity should be considered together.
The two dimensions can reinforce one another when coordinated effectively.
Is the Real Problem Execution?
There is another side to the argument, and Notre Dame’s coaching staff has legitimate reasons to emphasize it.
An offensive coordinator can design an excellent play that fails because of an inaccurate throw, missed block, or dropped reception.
Likewise, a quarterback can make the correct decision and still watch a promising possession collapse.
Football outcomes depend on coordinated execution across multiple positions.
Notre Dame’s BYU defeat provided evidence of that reality.
Carr missed opportunities that could have changed the game’s direction, including a potential early scoring throw.
CBS Sports also highlighted the contrast between Carr’s earlier efficiency and his more difficult performance against BYU’s defense.
Before that matchup, Carr had maintained at least a 63 percent completion rate and a passer rating above 155 in each previous game.
Against BYU, those standards proved difficult to maintain.
Head coach Marcus Freeman did not place the offensive shortcomings exclusively on his quarterback.
He acknowledged that missed opportunities could reflect mistakes by Carr, his receivers, or a combination of factors.
That assessment reflects the interconnected nature of passing-game execution.
An inaccurate throw may originate from pressure, poor footwork, miscommunication, or simply a quarterback mistake.
A failed third-down conversion might involve the route design, coverage recognition, blocking, or the timing of the pass.
Without examining each play, assigning universal blame would be misleading.
Still, execution and coaching are not opposing explanations.
Coaches influence execution through practice preparation, play selection, personnel deployment, and the difficulty of assignments.
Players remain responsible for making the necessary decisions and completing their responsibilities.
The most effective offenses combine sound design with dependable execution.
Notre Dame needs both.
The Difference Between Being Simple and Being Predictable
Some of college football’s most successful offenses rely on a relatively small collection of core concepts.
Their advantage comes from executing those concepts with exceptional precision while presenting them through different formations, motions, and personnel combinations.
Simplicity can accelerate decision-making.
Predictability, however, can accelerate the defense’s decision-making.
That is the distinction Notre Dame must examine during its bye week.
The Irish do not necessarily need dozens of additional plays.
They need opponents to hesitate before confidently identifying what is coming.
Pre-snap motion could help Carr recognize coverage while forcing defenders to communicate adjustments.
Formation changes could create different matchups without requiring the offense to abandon its preferred concepts.
More varied first-down passing could prevent opponents from automatically associating certain personnel groups with specific rushing tendencies.
Occasional play-action opportunities could punish defenders who attack aggressively against the run.
None of those adjustments guarantees success.
Together, however, they illustrate how an offense can become less predictable without becoming unnecessarily complicated.
For Denbrock, the challenge is finding which adjustments best suit his players.
For Carr, the challenge is turning those adjustments into confident, accurate decisions.
For Notre Dame, the challenge is making the entire system function under pressure.
The Schedule Will Not Wait for Notre Dame
Notre Dame’s October 24 bye week offers an important opportunity to examine the offense before another demanding stretch.
The Fighting Irish are scheduled to face Navy on October 31 at Gillette Stadium in Foxborough, Massachusetts.
A highly anticipated home matchup against Miami follows on November 7.
Boston College, SMU, and Syracuse complete Notre Dame’s regular-season schedule.
That sequence gives the Irish little room for complacency.
The BYU defeat already demonstrated how quickly a promising season can encounter serious adversity.
Notre Dame still has opportunities to strengthen its postseason position, but another defeat could complicate its College Football Playoff ambitions.
The upcoming games will test whether the offense can respond intelligently to defensive adjustments.
Navy presents a different challenge from BYU, requiring disciplined preparation and careful management of offensive possessions.
Miami offers another opportunity to evaluate Notre Dame against a prominent opponent with significant competitive expectations.
The Irish cannot assume that improved execution alone will resolve every offensive concern.
Nor should they abandon their offensive identity simply because one high-profile game ended painfully.
The objective must be meaningful improvement.
That means identifying which plays consistently create favorable situations and which tendencies opponents may be exploiting.
It also means evaluating whether Carr is being asked to make too many difficult throws without sufficient tactical advantages.
A championship-caliber offense should challenge defenses before the snap and after it.
Notre Dame has the personnel and coaching experience to pursue that standard.
Whether it can consistently achieve it remains an open question.
What Marcus Freeman Must Demand
Ultimately, Marcus Freeman is responsible for ensuring Notre Dame’s offensive development matches the program’s ambitions.
That does not require publicly criticizing Denbrock or dramatically changing the team’s philosophy.
It requires demanding accountability throughout the offensive operation.
Carr must improve his consistency against strong defenses.
Receivers must capitalize on available opportunities.
The offensive line must provide dependable protection and create productive rushing situations.
And Denbrock must ensure his play-calling gives those players realistic opportunities to succeed.
The BYU defeat should not be treated as proof that Notre Dame’s offensive approach cannot work.
It should be treated as evidence that the current approach deserves careful examination.
A talented offense can survive occasional mistakes.
But repeatedly asking players to overcome unfavorable situations can eventually become unsustainable.
That is particularly true against opponents capable of matching Notre Dame’s physical talent.
The best offensive coordinators understand that preparation involves more than selecting successful plays.
It involves anticipating how defenses will react and preparing answers before those adjustments become damaging.
Notre Dame’s offensive future may depend on how effectively Denbrock embraces that responsibility.
The Question That Could Define Notre Dame’s Season
The debate surrounding Notre Dame is ultimately bigger than three play-action passes.
It is about whether a talented offense is creating enough uncertainty to maximize its potential.
Carr has demonstrated that he can produce against college competition.
Greathouse, Faison, and the Irish backfield have shown that Notre Dame possesses legitimate offensive weapons.
Denbrock has the experience to understand how different offensive concepts fit together.
Yet the BYU defeat exposed the consequences when those pieces fail to produce consistently against a formidable opponent.
The reported play-action percentage provides one important clue, but it cannot explain every missed opportunity.
Notre Dame’s problems are unlikely to be solved by simply calling more deceptive passes.
They require better execution, smarter situational decisions, and enough offensive variation to keep opponents uncomfortable.
That combination is what separates productive offenses from truly dangerous ones.
The Fighting Irish still have time to make those improvements.
But the next phase of their season will demand evidence rather than promises.
If Carr begins finding cleaner throwing opportunities and the rushing attack creates more uncertainty, Notre Dame’s offensive outlook could change dramatically.
If familiar problems persist, criticism of Denbrock’s approach will only intensify.
And if the Irish continue struggling to capitalize on their talent, questions about the offense’s championship ceiling will become increasingly difficult to dismiss.
Notre Dame does not need to become an entirely different football team.
It needs to become a harder team to anticipate, a more consistent team to execute, and a more difficult team to defend.
The answer to the execution-versus-coaching debate is probably not one or the other.
Both must improve together.
Because when the next major opponent lines up across from CJ Carr, Notre Dame cannot afford to let the defense know what is coming.
And that may be the most important offensive challenge facing the Fighting Irish for the remainder of 2026.
